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IT'S :'1/0T WIIAT YOl PAY; IT'S WHAT IT COSTS YOt: 
A GEOTECHl\ICAL E:'I/Gil\EERil\G CASE STl OY 
J. Richard Cheeks, P. ~:. 
Stokley Cheeks and Associates. Inc 
Nicholasville. Kcntm:ky ~USA- 40356 
ABSTRACT 
Paper No_ 8.02 
The project consists of a middle ".elmo! construt·ted on a prcviou~ly undeveloped site. Site development required leveling a mountain 
ridge and perimeter tills up to ISO fCct deep to create the relatively level 1 S acre building site Access to the site required a 1000 foot 
long side hill road from the <ldjaccnt main highwa_y Neither the mvner mrr the design team obtained gcolcchnical investigations of the 
site As a result, they tailed to consider the impact of the geologic setting on seepage, ground water flow, and slope stability. Near the 
end of construction, slope mstabilities occurred in a cut section of the entrance road and one of the major embankment sections. The 
owner, the county school board, hired the writer to determine the cause of the instabilities and provide testimony in their on going 
litigation This paper summarizes the site conditions and pro_iect history. dc<;crihes the writer's investigation, describes the dispute 
resolution processes, and presents two procedural lessons learned from the case: the importance oC qualified professional geotedmical 
advice, and the inherent and sometimes unrecognized value nf ADR procedures 
KEYWORDS 
Geotechnical Engineering. r,roJC.'.sional Practice_ AOR_ Li1igatinn .. Ethics_ Cul1llvium. ~-ailure. Faults, Seepage 
INTRODUCTIO" 
Geotechnical engineers make important contributions to the 
design and construction process for design !Ccs typically less 
than 0.2 percent of construction cost \Vhcn properly tlsed, 
geotechnical engineers save the owner many times more thtHl 
the 0.2 percent fees by suggc.;;ting appropriate foundation 
systems and identit)~ng subsurface conditions peculiar to the 
site that require attention during design and construction 
In this case, the design team undervalued geotechnical adv1cc. 
One factor that possibly led to this attitude \vas that !he 
building w-ould be entirely rock supported in a major l~Ut 
section llowever, the conclusion that geotechnical 
engineering \Vas not needed f(H this project \vas misguided and. 
as a result, critical subsurface conditions such as the st.~cpage 
and historical landslide activitv \\'ere not identified The-se 
factors resulted in slope failures, protracted litigation, and 
damages estimated betv • .reen $800,000 and S 1.000_,000 
SITE CONDITIO"S A '\D GEOLOGIC SrTTI'iCi 
The owner selected the middle ~chool ~ite due to its pn_)\imit\' 
to the county's relatively new high school The site is located 
in mountainous terrain. The mountain tops occur at elevations 
of approximately :woo to :nou fCct Mean Sea Level (MSL), 
approxinMtely I 000 feet above the major valleys. The original 
site _gntdes r<1ngcd between 1450 feet rv1SL along the axis of 
the ridgt• at the north end of the site to 1220 teet MSL at the 
base of the ridge at the southern end 
CJently dipping beds of sandstone, shale, siltstone, coal and 
underclay of Pennsylvanian age underlie the site. There are 
two JlHJits, first on the north end of the site, and second along 
the highwrrr' alignment east of the site The first fault has 
experienced a relative displacement of about 160 feet, with the 
south side of the fault being up thrown The east end of this 
fault intersects the second fhult a reverse fault with the west 
side up throw·n. The rel<'ltivc displacement along the second 
Htult is about 200 feet south of the first Htult, and about 40 feet 
tc1 the nn11h "-Jo fault:- in this region have been seismically 
active in recenl geologic time 
The displacement <'It the first Htult truncated water bearing 
sando;;tone and coal layers and blocked these zones with up 
thrown silts;tone and shale units. This blockage and the gentle 
regional dip of about 400 to SOO tCet per mile from the 
norlh\\·est mto the fault cause seepage discharge at the fault 
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and historic slope instabilities due to the :.eepage on the east 
slopes north of the fault 
DESIGN PHASF. 
In 1986, the owner hired the sarne architecj who had designed 
the high school located on the opposite side of the high'<-'<ay 
At the owner's suggestion, the architect hired a local civil 
engineer for the site development design including the grading. 
access road, and utility service frorn the property boundaries to 
the cxte1ior huilding lines. The architect was responsible tlx 
the design of the structure, the pavmg and side walks 
As required by the owner/architect agrecmem, the architect 
asked the owner to provide a geotechnical report for tht· site 
In response, the same local ci\'il engineer oftered to pmvidt~ a 
soils report ev·en though he h21d no geotechnical training or 
expenence. The civil engineer's proposal lo the O\Vner 
included two test pits, two Standard Proctor compaction test.<.. 
determination of the soil bearing values, and a written report 
for a tCc of$ 1,21 ~. J'he owner submitted this proposal to the 
architect J(x his review and approv~il 
This work culminated in a one page, undated, unsigned report 
on plain paper (no letterhead) with two Standard Proctor 
laboratory compaction tests appended The report tersely 
summariLcd the site geology Regarding slope de~ign, the 
repoii states, 
Similar materials were crKountered and utili...-:ed in the 
constntction of US25F and the County: high school 
site Since the adjacent construction sites are '<-Vithin 
the same geologic formation, it is felt by the engineer 
that cut and till slopes previously utilized can be 
applied to this proposed site 
The report did not address important ~ite specitic gentcchmcal 
issues such as seepage, the exi:o.tcncc of colluvium on the 
natural east slopes, the impact of the faulting on hydrogeology 
and slope stability, or special handling procedures k)r slaking 
shale used in the embankments Furthermore, the report did not 
address common geotechnical engineering concerns of site 
preparation and construction monitoring such as proof rolling 
the subgrade, hench-mg the slnr)lng subgradc before 
embankment construction, till placemenJ, con1paction, or 
compaction testing 
This project included cuts and tills totaling over 400,000 cubil: 
yards of soil and rock. The excavated material was placed m 
fills around the perimeter of the ridge to balance quantities and 
produce a l) acre building site In addition. an <-h.: cess road 
was built on a side hill condition using 20 tOot cuts and tills 
Construction was divided into two phases Phase I provided 
access to the site, site grading, and utility construction to the 
building. Phase II paved 1h~ access road and parking lot, and 
constructed the school building_ The civil engineer developed 
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the Phase I plans and specifications, hut the architect issued 
these documents under the architect's name. The architect 
developed the Phase II plans and specifications. The owner 
hired two separate contractors 
The Phase f plaJJS indicated 2·1 (Horizontal Veritical) slopes 
tOr all fill and cu1 slopes in soil. However, the Phase r plans 
Hnd specitications for the project contained several deficiencies 
For example, 
• thert~ vvere no provisions for benching the natt~ral 
slope::. prior to placing fill 
• there \\-ere no provisions for internal embankment 
drai11age 
• the specification-"' defined two earth materials, 
"Eanh" and "Rock" llowcver. the definition of 
··Eanh" allowed the inclusion oflarge boulders as 
well as debris such as tree stumps, etc. 
• the testing and monitoring requirements in the 
specifications \vere not ?odequately defined 
PHASE I CO\JSTRl'CTIO\J 
The Pha~c r contractor submitted a total of 3! field density test 
repons fiJr the entire project The first of these tests was 
performed 011 April 30, 11)87. and the ltlst of the tests was 
performed on June ), 19S7 However, filling continued on the 
site through August l9B7, tmd most of the 1111 was untested 
The thirty~one tleld density tests are inadequate for a project 
havinu: 400._000 cubic yards of till Furthermore, of the 31 
tests.~ improper testing. procedures were used for many, an 
inappropriately low Proctor density was applied to the field 
densities, and 110 retests \vere performed after obtaining failing 
te::.t results /\bout 1\vo thirds of thL: tests are either 
unbelievable or indicate inadequate dry den.sity. For example, 
some of the reporte-d test results had a combination of dry 
density and moislure content that plot above the zero air voids 
curve in a range that can not occur in nature 
The Pha~C' I contractor observed seepage in a major fill area 
ncar the tlrst Jault The contractor had already placed a 
considerable volume of fill in the area befOre observing the 
sccpagt' rhe crvil engineer did not conduct any investigation 
of the seepage to determine its source or extent None the less, 
he directed the contr<1ctor to install a drain to collect water 
from the activel_y seeping area However, the drain discharged 
the water onto the face of the previously placed embankment 
slope and 011l_v collected \Vater from the s.ingle point source that 
had been observed 
On August 8, 1987, the Phase I contractor reported a landslide 
had st;rted along the entrance mad and requested a plan to 
resol\ c the ~lide problem However, he received no response, 
and befOre demobilizing, he regraded and revegetated the slide 
area. ending Phase I 
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ACCESS ROAD I.ANDSUDF 
The slide at the entrance road noted previously hy the Phase I 
contractor began to move again in June 1988. This landslide is 
not related to the Phase If contractor or activit)' except that it 
occurred during Phase II construction. Without determining 
the cause of the slide or the subsurface conditions at the slide 
area, the design team proposed a 200 t()ot long cantcle\'ered 
retaining wall to stabilize the road slide area The retaining 
wall ·'design'' specified a rock supported footing with a shcc11 
key Anchors. 3 fee! long and I inch in diameter, extend out 
oft he shear key into the rock The remedial plan also specitled 
the total removal of the soil to rock 15 feet hehind the \vall 
This 1500 cubic yard ex(avation vvould be backfilled \Vith 
cyclopean durable rock matenal Upon completion, the 
reconstructed slope behind the \\·all v,·ould be a maximum 2. 
inclination 
Implementation of this remedial program hcgan in September 
1988. By late OctoheL the contractor determined that the 
depth to rock along the \vall footing was neither uniform nor at 
the assumed elevation In Januarv 1989. just after the wall was 
completed, new movements occurred in and next ro the 
original slide area rhese nev .. i movement:. damaged the \\all 
and broke a water main The movements also placed an 
existing natural gas transmission line located _just above the 
active slide area at risk, and the gas company relocated the 
main to reduce the risk of rupture The Phiisc II contractor 
responded to these problems by calling fOr an engineering 
review of the slide conditions to determine its cause ;--md 
develop appropriate corrective active plans 
In mid February 1989. a geotechnical tlrm provided a proposal 
to evaluate the landslide and develop recommendations for 
corrective action The proposal represented a typical 
geotechnical approach to characterize the soiL rock and 
ground water conditions .... vith bonngs. observation wells. 
laboratory tests and anal;,sis culminating in a wntten report. 
The estimated ICc f(n this vmrk was$ 13,600. 
The Phase II contractor had employed a local grading 
subcontractor on the project to implt~mcnt thL: original 
corrective action J>lan Upon learning about the geotechnical 
proposal to investigate the slide. this subcontractor \\Tote the 
owner and, in part, said, 
It is my understanding that a gcotcclmical t1rm offered 
a proposal fc11· drilling the area at a co!'.t or 
approximately S [3,000.00 I believe \-VC can find an 
explanation Cor less expense 
The subcontractor circumvented the usual JOb communication 
protocol by \Vriting directly to the owner and bypassing the 
Phase II contractor. Furthermore, the subcontractor's rncs~age 
was in direct contlict \.Vith th~ Phase II contractor" s 
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recommendation to pcrfi.mn the geotechnical analyses before 
doing any additional work on the slide. The owner never 
authorized the geotechnical study of the slide 
The subcontractor "'orkcd with the owner and the design team 
by continuing tu excavate the slide material over the next six 
months. These activities catJsed the movements to spread up 
the slupe and mto adjacent areas of the slope By the following 
October, the subcontractor reports removing over 15,000 
cubic \ards of soil and rock fl·om the slope area with about 
13,000 cubic yards of crushed rock required to finish the work. 
By t1li~ time. the subcontractor declared bankruptcy, and the 
O\·vner finished the work with its own resources 
PARKI\G LOT I.A\iDSUDE 
In April 1 l/89, embankment failure occurred near the first fault 
again placing the natural gas transmission line located just 
belmv the active slide area at risk. The ga~ company relocated 
the line to reduce the risk of rupture The civil engineer stated 
that he was unable to determine the cause or total extent of the 
slide_ About ! I da_ys later, the civil engineer notified the Phase 
II contractor of this ne\v slide and demanded the Phase II 
contracwr's immediate attention The Phase II contractor 
responded by reminding the L~ivil engineer that "it is difficult to 
understand hmv work can go on if you don't know what is 
required · 
On \'Jay 24, 19S9, the architect directed the civil engineer to 
··proceed \vith haste in contacting" the same geotechnical firm 
that had prerared the proposal to evaluate the access road 
slide. On May 31, 191<:0, a principal of the geotechnical firm 
visited the site to observe the conditions. On June 5, 1989, he 
submitted a proposal to the owner in care oft he civil engineer. 
On June !9, !989, Lhe civil engineer met vv·ith a second 
geotechnical firm On June 21, 19&9, this second firm 
submitted a proposal to evaluate the parking lot slide. The first 
firm's proposal was for about $20,000 and the second firm's 
proposal \-vas tl)r flpproximatdy $30,000 
\~-'hile the c1vil engineer \.vns still obtaining the geotechnical 
engineering proposals, he was also soliciting quotes to repair 
the ne\\ slide area from the local grading subcontractor 
mentioned previously On June 21, 1989, the local 
!-:ubcontractor bid $35.900 to repair the slide On June 22, 
1989, the Owner "put on hold any actions on" the parking lot 
slide or the gcotcclmical evaluations of the slide However, on 
July 6, 1989, the civil engineer met at the site with a technician 
employed by ~l third geotechnical engineenng finn 
Subsequently, this third firm drilled eleven (II) auger borings 
into the slide area This work culminated in a written report on 
August 4. 198(). If one compare~ the scope of vvork performed 
by the third tirm to the scopes of work proposed by the first 
f\H) firms. clearly the third firm perfOrmed C\ greatly reduced 
scope limited to the auger borings and a report of the findings 
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These borings encountered wood fragments at several 
locations. Furthermore, the till material was very '1-vet and 
consisted of a mixture of soil and Vveathcred shale Shmdard 
Penetration Test N Values within the fill /.one ranged from I to 
20 blows per foot Given that rock fbtgmcnts and other 
obstructions within the fill distorted these lest results up\.,·ard, 
one can comJude that the phase I contractor had not 
adequately compacted the fill. This report concluded that 
seepage \Vithin the fill was the bas1c cause or the bilure 
However, the lack of compaction, the absence of stability 
benches, and the burial of trees Jnd other simibr materials near 
the toe oft he slope also contributed to the failure 
As noted above, the specitication defines "Earth"' a~ '·dirt, 
debris, loose rock of one cubii..: yard or less_ soft rock or other 
materials which can be rcmm.·ed by hard (~ic hand) tools, 
power tools or by npping with a buUdozer '' It should not be 
surprising that borings drilled into the failed embankment 
encountered wood fragments. The civil engineer then admiltcd 
that he had allov•,ted the contractor to burv trees. stumps and 
related matter in the toe area 
The civil enginee-r developed a corrective actil)l1 plan tOr the 
parking lot slide based upon the third geotechnical engineer's 
boring data and report This plan specilied the complete 
reconstruction of the failed embankment to restore the site to 
its original design configuration llo\vever. the engineer's 
construction cost estimate for the work was about $41 OJJOO, 
and the mvner directed a redesign to redlJCC the cost rhc 
redesign included the removal of the fill material from within 
the failure ?one, regrmling the Hrea on 2. 1 ~lopes \-vith benches 
every 40 to 50 feet in elevation, and the installation of 
horizontal drains on each bench to relieve the seepage 
pressures This revised approach reduced the size of the 
parking lot The owner iniiiatcd litigation and b\d this. remedial 
work in the s.pring of 1990 The contractor completed the 
project in early 1991 at a cost of$219,000 In spite of these 
eftOrts, slope movement.-., continue to occur in this area. 
WRITER INVESTIGATES SLOPF INSTAHILITIES 
The owner's lawyer contacted the author in June 1990 to 
observe the landslides and determine their cause. and provide 
testimony in their litigation Initially, the writer rcvievved the 
project documentation and the various geotechnical proposals 
and reports. The author then conducted an independent 
investigation of the access road slide. the parking lot slide., and 
the general stability oft he colluvial mountain slopes. 
The invcsrigation included twenty-one (21) borings thal 
determined the range of subsurl7tce conditions. The aulhor 
drilled these borings according to AST~-·1 J) .. l 586 using hollo\\ 
.. . , ....... -· _, ·. 1. . 
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bedrock .:md veri!~~ its nature and continuity· At several of the 
boring locations, the author convc11ed the bore holes to 
~tandpipe monitoring \Veils and slope inclinometers The 
author abo established a lateral movement monitoring program 
by setting surt8.ce points along t.he crest of the reconstructed 
parking lot slide area. The report addressed 
• the range of thickness and engineering properties 
of tl1C colluvium on the natural slopes, 
• the location of the phreatic swface within the 
colluvium and embankments, 
• the geometry of the natural and as built slopes, 
• the Standard Penetration Resistance of the 
colluvium and compacted Jill materials, 
• the probable cause of the slope failures, 
• estimates of slope safety factors, and 
• recommendations for remedial con~truction 
DISCLSSIOI'i OF Till CASF 
The o'>-\ner. dcs1gncrs. and contractors designed and built the 
middle school project v .. ·ithout the benefit of geotechnical or 
geologic engineering ln addition. the attempts to correct the 
vanous slides during and at1cr the construction period were 
done without the bencth of geotechnical engineering As a 
result, the parties never understood the subsurfilce conditions 







The types of material that would be encountered 
in the e:-.:cavations and their engmeenng 
properties were not determined. 
The cxi~tence and significance of the cotluvium 
on the existing slopes was missed 
The :.pecitlcd handling, placement and 
compaction criteria tOr the maior fills were 
unacceptable /{.)r the soil or shale that represent 
the vast majority of till constituents 
The natural slopes vvcre not benched prior to till 
placement 
internal drainJgc provisions \\•ere not mcluded in 
the design of the embankments and field attempts 
to control seepage discharge were inadequate. 
Attempts to correct the landslides were done 
~,., ithout determining the subsurt'ace conditions or 
the cause of the slides, and, as a result, the repair 
attempts failed 
Throughout this process. the owner incurred financial 
obligation~ to construct the retaining \Vall, Lo relocate the 
natural gas transmission line, to reconstruct the parking lot 
::..Jidc. and to r~pair the access road slide Total estimated 
damaf.!;es "',-ere $800,000 to $1,000,000 In the writer's 
7 
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From a technical perspective, the st:epagc rrom the ~andstone 
and coal beds along and no11h of the fitult line produced a high 
phreatic sur!Etce V•:ithin the embankment and nC~tural slopes tlmt 
reduced the safety tJ.ctors sutliciently to cause failure 
However. the mvner and design team chos.e not to SC'ck 
qualified geotechnical advice during design, construction, or 
afier the landslides developed This general lack of regard for 
geotechnical engineering constitutes the primary procedural 
shortcoming that produced the failures 
LITIGATION RES!ILTS 
The owner initiated litigation in this case in the spring of 1990 
The complaint named the Phase I and Phase II contractors, the 
architect, and the civil eng'n1eer as defendants Discovery 
lasted about 5 years During this period, the civil engineer's 
office burned and all of his project files were lost The civil 
engineer also died unexpectedly. ]c(lving his mining engineer 
partner to defend the suit 
In the summer of 1994, the parties attempted to resolve this 
dispute through medi<'ltion During the mediation. the 
defendants agreed to pay about $120,000 directly to the 
natural gas company fix the gas transmission line relocations 
After this extended dav of medi(ltion, subsequent attempts to 
settle the remaining elements of the case were unsuc~.:essfid, 
and the case went to trial in February. J 995 
The jury trial began in the county seat or the owner school 
board In their opening statements. the 0\\'ner argued tim! he 
had hired design and construction professionals and trusted 
them to perfom1 properly lie further argued that the Jailures 
clearly demonstrated their respective negligence fhe architect 
argued that the slope failures were unrelated to the architect's 
responsibilities on the project The decea~ed civil engineer's 
partner argued that the service~ his fOrmer panncr had 
provided were consistent \vith generally accepted engineer:ng 
practice. The Phase I contractor argued that he followed the 
plans and specifications and the design \vas deficient The 
Phase 11 contractor argued that he had no responsibility tc-11 the 
failures or the e"Xpansion of the failure arcn during the owner 
and design team mandated repair attempts 
While the first witness was giving testimony. a juror's il:imJly 
member became ill, ratising the trial to recess for one dav 
During this recess, the parties settled the remaining clements of 
the case for $500.000 J'he \\Titer is not <l\Var·e of L]H:' relative 
contributions to this settlement b_v the various defendants 
This litigation took five year:- to resolve and cost the parties 
substantial sums. Considering the limited infom1ation available 
to the author, the owm~r·s litigation costs were probably over 
$200,000 The defendants each mounted substantial detCnses 
that included expert consultation and deposition testimony. 
The total combined litigation costs for this ca~e probably 
exceeded $400,000 
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LeSSONS LloAR "\FD 
Of course, this should go without saying. All engineering 
cc1des of ethics J:u-niliar to the writer clearly restr<'lin engineers 
from otlCring to \Vork outside their areas of expertise. 
flmvever. as this case clearly illustrates, some design 
professionals do offer to provide services beyond their training 
and experience Owners, who often have no technical 
background, have <1 right to rely upon the proJbssionaJ 
engineer's ethical compliance and thereby trust that the 
engineer has the requisite experience and training to provide all 
o!ltred services 
In our example. the O\·vner had a bias in favor of working with 
the local engineer if possible I ~ocal tax dollars spent with local 
businesses: a widely held political vie\"i However, the owner 
certainly \vanted sound, reliable advice from any professional 
working on the project The mvner urged the architect to 
include the local civil engineer on the design team. However, 
from the architccfs per:'.pedive, this simple request implicitly 
meant that the owner would probably hire an architect who 
would agree to hire the local engineer Therefore, the architect 
complied \Vith the owner's request and placed the local 
engineer on the design team 
lhe local engineer may· have had the required experience and 
training to provide the specif-ic design services assigned to him 
by the architect However, the same engineer also offered to 
provide the required geotechnical services even though the 
local c1vil e11gincer was clearly not qualified to provide 
geotechnic<1l engineering services. llowcver, the architect 
continued to feel the owner"s pressure and, as a result, failed to 
indicate that the ov.,rJer should hire a qualified geotechnical 
engi11eer to conduct the subsurface investigation instead of the 
local ci\·il cngmeer 
!'he ov;ncr -t!Jn.varded the local engmeer\ proposal fOr the 
soils report to the architect for his review and advice. The 
mvner wanted the architect's counsel because the architect had 
specifically invoked the owner's obligation to provide a soils 
report to the design team Linder the terms of the 
owner/architect agreement. This act by the owner created a 
related dul)' for the architect to lJSe his expertise and 
cxpcnence in assessing the proposal's adequacy. The architect 
responded v,:ith a v.Titten approval 
This particular architect \Vas nearing the end his career_ Over 
the vcars_ he had many opportunities to review geotechnical 
proposals and reports, and to interact with practicing 
geotechnical engineers He either knew or ~hould have known 
that the proposal submit!ed for his review was inadequate. 
Furthermore. when the cngincc1 submitted the ''soils report'', 
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its inadequacy was apparcm on its face. However. the 
architect decided not to advise the O\vncr that the proposal and 
the report were inadequate and inconsistent with geotechnical 
work 
Do No.t..Bc Discourage<Uf.EarlyJ~.r.~.=.JriJtl Settlt;mern. '~!tempts 
Appear To rail 
Construction industry disputes u~ually involve complex ISsues, 
large amounts of money .. and multiple parties These factors 
can magnifY the disputants' differences and discourage any face 
to face discussions As a direct result. they place greater 
reliance upon their lawyers and sometimes their experts to 
resolve the matter on the disputant's behalf Hovvever, the 
lawyers tend to adopt the adversarial postures required tOr 
litigation, and these positions are not consistent 1.vith the 
conciliatoty approach that is usually required to achieve a t~tir 
out of court settlement 
Furthennore, the disputants, whether they are mvners, design 
professionals or constmction professionals. tend to view the 
issues from their unique perspectives Their narrow vi<;;ion 
limits their ability to seriously consider the validity of the 
opposing vie\vs 
neither the owner 
For example, at the end of this dispute, 
nor the architect was able to admit their 
respective contributions to the merflll problem even though the 
decision to hire the local t.:ivil engineer f{)f the geotechnical 
work clearly set the gears of failure into motion The owner 
was not able to understand that his early intervention on behalf 
of the locfll engineer applied undue pressure on the architect 
Likewise. the architect could not admit that he had yielded to 
this pressure in the f3.ce of' an inadequate gcotl'chnic(ll S\UCI\ 
Alternatives to the process dri\ en and <1dversarial 
litigation/binding arbitration can often overcome the obstacles 
to communication and reasoning by introducing a neutral partv 
into the discussions. The neutral pal1y listens to each 
disputant's position, distill') the core issues in dispute, <~nd 
forces each disputant to seriously address the opposing vicv.:s 
While mediation or other ADR processes may not resolve the 
case during the allotted time, the disputants will usually· leave 
the process with a better understanding or not onlv theit 
positions, but those of the other parties as well. As the trial 
date approaches, the parties fl·equently settle virtually on the 
court house steps. These I I th hour resolutions have often 
grov . rn from previnus "unsuccessful"' settlement di:;cussions 
Mediation, l\.·1ediation/Arbitnttiml. and other A.OR procedures 
should be implemented by the disputants as soon as possible 
Even if early attempts to resolve the dispute appear to rail. 1hc 
parties should continue to explore every· pn~sible avenue to 
resolve their differences befOre engaging an adversarial 
process Even then. the pat1ies should be receptive to any 
attempt to settle throt1ghout discovery 
956 
Experience suggests that over ninety pcrc~nt of all construction 
dispute~ are settled prior to trial or arbitration Furthennore, 
data suggests that of the money consumed by these disputes, 
about tw-o thirds is spent on lav,'yers, experts, discovery, and 
other related systemic costs Only about one third of the 
money is available to ··fix" the problems. Jn this case, the 
writer estimates that 1he mvner spent about $200,000 or more 
to obtain the $620,000 l /- selllcment paid to the plaintiff~,. 
The various defendants probably spent another $200,000 or 
more in litigation expenses TherefOre, total settlement and 
dispute rcsolu!ion costs of$ 1 .()20,000 or higher were incurred, 
and at the end of the day, the owner neHed about $420,000 or 
less to apply to the $800.000 to $1,000,000 estimated 
damages. 
CLOSURE 
The design Learn and O\VntT em only determine an appropriate 
level of geotechnical service aticr discussing the geotechnically 
signilican1 project parameters with an experienced geotechnical 
engmeer. Then the geotechnical engineer can fully discuss the 
nsks and provide recommendations for exploration, testing, 
and analyses to determine the significant subsurface conditions 
;wd develop a 1..vritten report that provides engineering 
recommendations tOr design and constmction to mitigate 
against the ri:>.ks The bo11om line is that a geotechnical 
engineer should be included on the design team early during 
design J()r any projec! involving e<:~rth supported structures or 
eanh construction 
\Vhen no geotechnical advice is obtained, or inexperienced 
engineers attempt geotechnical engineering, significant site and 
subsurface conditions often remain undetected. As in this case, 
these unidentilicd conditions ollcn become known during or 
after construction, resulting in project delays, tB.ilure of project 
structures, ltlcreased construction costs, damages to third 
parties, and allegations of negligence. 
The decision m this case to try saving the $10,000 to $20.000 
thot may haw hccn required for a design phase geotechnical 
evaluation resulted in $800,000 to $LOOO.OOO in estimated 
dam<1gcs and litigation costs totalling over $400,000. The 
failure to have construction monitoring and testing by an 
experienced geotechnical cngmcer during the earthwork 
resulted in a major embankment failure and important site 
conditions being misunderstood The decision to attempt the 
landslide repairs \Vithout investing the $13,000 and $20,000 to 
clctcnnine the causes or the failures resulted in unsuccessful 
and more costly repairs This project proves the old adage, 
It's not what :you pay; it's what it costs you. 
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